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Abstract
Saudi human rights lawyer and pro-democracy activist Waleed Abu 
Al-Khair was convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the 
reputation of the King.” As a result, he is currently serving a fifteen-year 
prison sentence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. This Article analyzes 
Abu Al-Khair’s criminal conviction under international law, with a focus 
on the universal standard for the protection of freedom of expression.
Specifically, this article explores international law rules that call for narrow 
constructions of the offenses of “incitement” and “defamation” under 
domestic law when dealing with public figures and public affairs. Portions 
of this paper have been reproduced with updates from a prior 2016 Human 
Rights Foundation Report, written by the same authors of this article. This 
Article is intended to replace the 2016 Report previously published.***
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article analyzes the case of Waleed Abu Al-Khair, a human 
rights lawyer in Saudi Arabia, under international law. Abu Al-Khair was
convicted for “inciting public opinion” and “harming the reputation of the 
King,” and is currently serving a fifteen-year prison sentence in Saudi 
Arabia. Part I provides a succinct overview of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia’s legal system. Part II lays out the standards of international law for 
the protection of freedom of expression as applicable to the case of Waleed 
Abu Al-Khair. Part III analyzes all the actions and omissions by the 
government of Saudi Arabia under international law. Part IV summarizes 
the conclusions reached in each part of this Article.
II. SAUDI ARABIA’S LEGAL SYSTEM
Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy,1 which bases its legal system2
                                                     
*** See infra note 39.
1. Article 5 of the Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia states:
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on Shari’a law,3 as advocated by the Wahhabi movement.4 The Shari’a, 
which translates as the law of God, is a set of moral precepts interpreted as 
binding law primarily sourced in the Qur’an and the Sunnah of the 
Prophet.5 Shari’a law regulates all areas of Muslim life,6 including family, 
                                                     
Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Rulers of the 
country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder King Abdulaziz bin 
Abdulrahman Al-Faisal Al-Saud, and their descendants. The most upright among 
them shall receive allegiance according to Almighty God's Book and His 
Messenger's Sunna (Traditions) . . . Government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
derives its authority from the Book of God and the Sunna of the Prophet (PBUH), 
which are the ultimate sources of reference for this Law and the other laws of the 
State.
Basic Law of Governance of Saudi Arabia, art. 5 (adopted by decree) (1992) [hereinafter Basic Law of 
Governance]; ANN BLACK ET AL., MODERN PERSPECTIVES ON ISLAMIC LAW 256 (2013).  Saudi Arabia 
is the “best model of the authoritarian view” of Shari’a law. BLACK ET AL., supra note 1.
2. See SHARIA INCORPORATED: A COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW OF THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF 
TWELVE MUSLIM COUNTRIES IN PAST AND PRESENT 157 (Jan Michiel Otto ed., 2010) [hereinafter 
SHARIA INCORPORATED].
It is often claimed that Saudi law is nothing but Islamic Shari’a. However, 
supplemented by government-issued regulations concerning labor, commerce 
companies and so forth, the law is more encompassing than at first glance. Also, 
one cannot rule out the importance of tribal values and customs in Saudi society, 
like in most Middle Eastern societies.
See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 71 (“In the domestic law of some Muslim countries, such as Saudi 
Arabia, Iran and Malaysia, Islam is either the principal source of law or a source of law and, therefore, 
being a Muslim has significant legal consequences under these domestic legal systems”).
3. See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 23 (internal citation omitted) (“According to 
Islamic jurisprudence, theology and historiography, the rules of sharia are based on the revelation by 
God of his plan for mankind to the Prophet Muhammad until his death in 632.  In order to interpret 
God’s will from the available sources, religious scholars developed Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) from the 
eighth century onwards.  The scholars (ulama) put God’s revelation into effect, drafting a scientific, 
legal corpus of behavioural rules.” “There is no such thing as a, that is one, Islamic law, a text that 
clearly and unequivocally establishes all the rules of a Muslim’s behaviour.  There is a great divergence 
of views, not just between opposing currents, but also between individual scholars within the legal 
currents, of exactly what rules belong to Islamic law.”). See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 10 (“the 
assumption is that there are four major sources of Islamic law: the Quran, the Sunna, analogical 
reasoning (qiyas) and consensus of opinion (ijma)”).
4. The term “Wahhabi” derives from the religious scholar and jurist Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab, (1703-1793) who “based his ideas on the works of the Salafi tradition within Islam,
particularly as [adopted] by two legal scholars, namely Ahmad ibn Hanbal, founder of the Hanbali 
School of Law . . . .  The Hanbali doctrine distinguishe[s] itself from other Sunni schools of law by its 
strict adherence to the holy sources.”  See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 142.  “The Wahhabi 
interpretation of the Shari’a necessitates the abandonment of precedent and jurisprudence, providing 
individual Saudi judges with wide discretion.” AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
BAHRAIN, THE PRETENSE OF PROGRESS iii (2015) http://www.adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/
2015/03/ADHRB_Pretense-of-Progress_v1_web.pdf [hereinafter PRETENSE OF PROGRESS].
5. The Sunnah is defined as
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tort, contract, commercial, property, and criminal law. 7 In addition, 
religious scholars have developed Islamic jurisprudence (“fiqh”) for all 
matters that are not addressed in the Qu’ran and the Sunnah.8 Islamic 
jurisprudence provides an additional authoritative source to the Shari’a law 
and is used by judges in their administration of justice.9
Unlike most Muslim majority states, Saudi Arabia has not codified the 
Shari’a principles in local statutes or codes.10 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia 
has no codified laws with the exception of the Basic Law of Governance 
and additional regulations enacted by royal decrees.11 As a consequence, 
most areas of the law, including criminal law, are regulated by religious 
principles that are not embodied in a written legal instrument and are
therefore subject to the discretion of Saudi judges. Under the Wahhabi 
doctrine, the law is subject to judicial interpretation of holy texts and 
jurisprudence is based on a particular judge’s religious beliefs and personal 
understanding of Islam.12 Saudi judges are not bound to resort to previous 
decisions relating to similar cases.13 Therefore, neither the stare decisis nor 
the jurisprudence constante doctrines are followed in Saudi Arabia.
                                                     
[A] body of established customs and beliefs that make up a tradition. In Muslim 
legal and religious thought, the term became associated more specifically with the 
actions and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. Inspired by God to act wisely 
and in accordance with his will, Muhammad provided an example that 
complements God's revelation as expressed in the Qur'an. His actions and 
sayings became a model for Muslim conduct as well as a primary source of 
Islamic law.
Sunnah, OXFORD ISLAMIC STUD. ONLINE, http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t243/e33
(last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
6. See BLACK ET AL., supra note 1, at 243 (in “Islamic monarchies, like Saudi Arabia, . . . 
Sharia is pivotal to all aspects of law and governance”).
7. Toni Johnson & Mohammed Aly Sergie, Islam:  Governing Under Sharia, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/islam-governing-under-sharia (last updated July 25, 
2014).
8. See ABU AMEENAH BILAL PHILIPS, THE EVOLUTION OF FIQH (ISLAMIC LAW & THE
MADH-HABS) 8 (1990), https://d1.islamhouse.com/data/en/ih_books/single/en_evolution_of_fiqh.pdf.
9. See Law of the Judiciary, ROYAL EMBASSY SAUDI ARABIA, art. 1, https://www
.saudiembassy.net/law-judiciary (last visited Jan. 20, 2018) (in the administration of justice judges 
should apply the “provisions of Sharia and laws in force,” which in this case include ‘fiqh.’).
10. Nathan J. Brown, Why Won’t Saudi Arabia Write Down Its Laws?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 
23, 2012, 2:10 PM), http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/01/23/why-wont-saudi-arabia-write-down-its-laws/.
11. See SHARIA INCORPORATED, supra note 2, at 156 (“The King can promulgate regulations 
(called nizams) where the Shari’a law does not provide a direct answer to certain legal questions but 
where regulations are nevertheless necessary such as in commercial matters.”).
12. See MAHA A. Z. YAMANI, POLYGAMY AND LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SAUDI ARABIA 139
(2008).
13. Id.
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Due to the overt control of the executive power over prosecutors and 
judges, the judiciary is not an independent authority in Saudi Arabia.14
Furthermore, the wide authority given to Saudi judges in interpreting and 
applying Islamic laws contribute to creating a judicial system characterized 
by pervasive arbitrariness and abuse of power. This has led in practice to a 
considerable amount of arbitrary prosecutions of peaceful activists and 
dissenters on politically motivated charges.
Saudi Arabia is among the worst violators of basic human rights, in 
particular the right to freedom of opinion and expression.15 The Kingdom 
scored the worst possible grade in Freedom House’s 2015 Freedom in the 
World index, which focuses on civil liberties and political rights in a 
particular country.16 Although the Kingdom has signed several United 
Nations (U.N.) human rights treaties,17 it has firmly opposed the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) for allegedly being in contradiction 
with the principles of the Shari’a Law.18
III. STANDARD FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
The legal framework for the freedom of expression, a fundamental 
human right, is firmly established in the UDHR and the International 
                                                     
14. See GAN BUS. ANTI–CORRUPTION PORTAL, SAUDI ARABIA CORRUPTION REPORT (2016), 
https://www.business-anti-corruption.com/country-profiles/saudi-arabia.
15. Arch Puddington & Tyler Roylance, Anxious Dictators, Wavering Democracies:  Global 
Freedom Under Pressure, FREEDOM HOUSE (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-
2016/overview-essay-anxious-dictators-wavering-democracies.
16. Freedom in the World—Saudi Arabia (2015), FREEDOM HOUSE, https://freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-world/2015/saudi-arabia#.VSWKSktN1Zg (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
17. See, e.g., International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women, Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, Saudi Arabia, 40th Sess., U.N. Doc CEDAW/C/SAU/CO/2 (Apr. 8, 2008); Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 
85; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. (noting that the Kingdom 
ratified these conventions with reservations).
18. See Jonathan Russell, Human Rights:  The Universal Declaration vs. The Cairo 
Declaration, LSE MIDDLE E. CTR. BLOG (Dec. 12, 2010), http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2012/12/10/1569/.
Most Muslim-majority countries including Egypt, Iran and Pakistan signed the 
UDHR in 1948, but crucially Saudi Arabia, where the King must comply with the 
Shari’a and Qur’an, did not sign the declaration, arguing that it violated Islamic 
law and criticising it for failing to take into consideration the cultural and 
religious context of non-Western countries.
See also id. (explaining that Saudi Arabia refused to sign the UDHR believing that it violated the Qur'an 
and Sharia law).
374 ILSA Journal of International & Comparative Law [Vol. 24:2
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).19 One hundred and sixty-
nine countries, excluding Saudi Arabia, are parties to the ICCPR. 20
Additionally, Saudi Arabia is both a member of the U.N. and the U.N.
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) and is thus bound to promote and 
encourage respect and human rights for all. 21 In fact, the rights and 
freedoms provided in the ICCPR are inspired by the principles proclaimed 
in the Charter of the U.N., which binds member states to “promote
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms,”22 pursuing the “ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom”23 in accordance with the UDHR.
The freedom of expression maintains universal recognition, evidenced 
by its inclusion in every regional human rights treaty, including Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, 24 Article 13 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights,25 and Article 9 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.26
                                                     
19. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR]; G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948).
20. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, ch. IV, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chap
ter=4&lang=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
21. G.A. Res. 16/18, at 1 (Apr. 12, 2011). 
22. ICCPR, supra note 19, pmbl.
23. Id.
24. Freedom of Expression:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.  This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without 
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.  This article shall not 
prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema 
enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in 
the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.
Freedom of Expression, Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10, ¶¶ 1–2.
25. Freedom of Thought and Expression:
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Similarly, Saudi Arabia maintains obligations under the regional 
human rights framework. Article 32 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 
holds that the “Charter shall ensure the right to information, freedom of 
opinion and freedom of expression, freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information by all means, regardless of frontiers.” 27 Saudi Arabia has 
ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights, 28 and must honor the 
obligations it undertook under Article 32. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has 
been a member state of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation29 (OIC) 
                                                     
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression. This right 
includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or 
through any other medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing paragraph shall not be 
subject to prior censorship but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of 
liability, which shall be expressly established by law to the extent necessary to 
ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
b. the protection of national security, public order, or public health or 
morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, 
such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio 
broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, 
or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of 
ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments 
may be subject by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating 
access to them for the moral protection of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or religious 
hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any other similar action 
against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of race, 
color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses 
punishable by law.
Freedom of Thought and Expression, Am. Conv. on H.R., art. 13, ¶¶ 1–5.
26. Afr. Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights art. 9, ¶¶ 1–2. (stating that “[e]very individual 
shall have the right to receive information [and] [e]very individual shall have the right to express and 
disseminate his opinion within the law”).
27. League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12
INT’L HUM. RTS. REP. 893 (2005) (entered into force Mar. 15, 2008), translated in UNIV. OF MINN. HUM.
RTS. [hereinafter Arab Charter].
28. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Article 43 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights:  Reconciling 
National, Regional, and International Standards, 26 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 91, 93 (2013) (listing the 
Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA) states that have thus far ratified the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights).
29. History, ORGANISATION ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-oci.org/page/?p_id=52
&p_ref=26&lan=en (last visited Jan. 20, 2018).
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since 1969. Among the objectives stated in the Charter of the OIC is the 
promotion of “human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, 
rule of law, democracy and accountability in Member States in accordance 
with their constitutional and legal systems.”30
By adopting the ICCPR, the international community legally
recognized that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; 
this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and 
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, 
in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”31 This 
includes the right of individuals to “hold opinions without interference.”32
The U.N. Human Rights Committee33, charged with compliance and 
oversight of the ICCPR, stated in its observations on the subject that
“[f]reedom of opinion and freedom of expression are indispensable 
conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential for 
any society.” 34 The [Human Rights Committee] also affirmed that
“[f]reedom of expression is a necessary condition for the realization of the 
principles of transparency and accountability that are, in turn, essential for 
the promotion and protection of human rights.”35 In addition, respect of 
freedom of opinion should be binding on all branches of the state and on all
                                                     
The Organi[z]ation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) [formerly Organization of the 
Islamic Conference] is the second largest inter-governmental organization after 
the United Nations with a membership of 57 states [and] spreads [across] four 
continents.  The [OIC] is the collective voice of the Muslim world . . . [and 
ensuring] to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit 
of promoting international peace and harmony among various people of the world.  
The [OIC] was established upon a decision of the historical summit which took 
place in Rabat, Kingdom of Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (September 25, 
1969) following the criminal arson of Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. Id.
30. Charter of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, art. 1, ¶ 14.
31. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
32. Id.
33. The United Nations Human Rights Committee is the body responsible for overseeing and 
advising ratified States on the implementation of the ICCPR treaty principles within that State.  As of 
April 2012, 160 States had ratified the ICCPR.  Introduction: Monitoring Civil and Political Rights,
UNITED NATIONS HUM. RTS. OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/CCPR/
Pages/CCPRIntro.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
34. Human Rights Committee, Article 19:  Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, General 
Comment No. 34, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
34].
35. Id. ¶ 3.
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governmental authorities at whatever level.36 Furthermore, the scope of 
protection of this right “includes expression of views and opinions that 
offend, shock or disturb.” 37 Therefore, and especially in a context of 
political debate, restrictions to the right to freedom of opinion should not be 
applied to “expression of opinion and dissent, religion or belief.”38
The international standard of freedom of expression protects against 
abusive use of defamation laws aiming at criminalizing legitimate criticism 
and stifling freedom of expression.
A. Defamation Under the International Standard of Freedom of 
Expression
1. General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech
The Human Rights Committee stated that criminalizing the holding of 
an opinion is incompatible with Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR.39 In 
fact, any efforts to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion is 
prohibited,40 and “harassment, intimidation or stigmatization of a person, 
including arrest, detention, trial or imprisonment for reasons of the opinions 
they may hold, constitutes a violation of Article 19, Paragraph 1.”41
2. Special Prohibition Against the Criminalization of Speech 
Directed at Public Officials
Under the universal standard of the ICCPR, defamation laws must not 
stifle freedom of expression.42 For official defamation law to comply with 
international law requirements, it must satisfy the following six-prong test.
                                                     
36. Human Rights Committee, Nature of the General Legal Obligation on States Parties to the 
Covenant, General Comment No. 31, ¶ 4, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (Mar. 29, 
2004).
37. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection 
of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 37, 17th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27 (May 16, 2011) [hereinafter HRC 17th Sess.].
38. Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 81, 14th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/23 (Apr. 20, 2010) [HRC 14th Sess.].
39. JAVIER EL-HAGE & CELINE ASSAF BOUSTANI, HUMAN RIGHTS FOUND., THE CASE OF 
WALEED ABU AL-KHAIR 25 (2016).
40. Id. See also Yong-Joo Kang v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 878/1999, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/78/D/878/1999 (2003).
41. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 25; see Andre Alphonse Mpaka-Nsusu v. Zaire, 
Commc’n No. 157/1983, U.N. Doc. Supp. No. 40 (A/41/40) at 142 (1986) [hereinafter HRC Zaire].
42. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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The first prong requires that laws on defamation are drafted in 
accordance with the elements used to measure limitations on freedom of 
expression, as set forth in Article 19, Section 3 of the ICCPR, namely the 
legality, legitimacy, necessity and proportionality of those limitations. 43
First, restrictions on freedom of expression must be formally provided for 
by law.44 In other words, they must be codified by a country’s statutes. 
Moreover, they must not be overbroad and must be precise enough that it is 
clear what particular types of behaviors are precluded by the law.45 Second,
those limitations must emanate from a need to protect a legitimate state 
interest.46 Recognized state interests include protecting the rights of others, 
maintaining national security, ensuring public order and health, and/or 
preserving morals.47 Third, restrictions on freedom of expression must be
necessary.48 In other words, a restriction should only be applied if it is the 
only way to achieve protection of the legitimate state interest.49 Finally, 
restrictions on the freedom of expression must be proportional.50 Methods 
of limiting expression, if necessary and for a legitimate purpose, must be 
implemented in the narrowest possible manner. In other words, criminal or 
civil penalties discouraging particular forms of expression must not be 
overboard, 51 and must be proportionate to the interest being protected. 
Proportionality requires applying the minimum criminal or civil sanction 
possible to expressions that must be limited for necessary and legitimate 
purposes.52
The second prong requires the defamatory statement in question to be 
a fact statement instead of an opinion that is not subject to verification.53
The third prong imposes a heightened standard for public officials and 
                                                     
43. Id. ¶¶ 24–25, 33–34.
44. Id. ¶ 22.
45. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
46. Id. ¶¶ 29, 34.
47. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 21.
48. Id. ¶ 33.
49. Id. See also Human Rights Committee, Ballantyne, Davidson, and McIntryre v. Cananda, 
Commc’n Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, ¶ 11.4, 47th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/47/D/359/1989 and 
385/1989/Rev.1, (Mar. 31, 1993) [hereinafter HRC 47th Sess.].
50. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.
51. Id.
52. See Human Rights Committee, Article 12 (Freedom of Movement), General Comment No. 
27, ¶ 14, 67th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9, (Nov. 2, 1999); Human Rights Committee, 
Rafael Marques de Morais v. Angola, Communication No. 1128/2002, ¶ 6.8, 83rd Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/83/D/1128/2002, (Mar. 14–Apr. 2005) [hereinafter HRC 83rd Sess.].
53. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
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figures, because they are naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.54
The fourth prong requires the existence of actual malice in the defendant’s 
actions in cases concerning public officials/figures. 55 The fifth prong 
indicates that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff.56 The sixth and last 
prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant—truth and public
interest of the subject matter.57
Throughout the years, the Human Rights Committee has developed a 
stringent standard rejecting the criminalization of speech directed at public 
officials and highlighting that citizens of any society must be able to freely 
criticize their government “without fear of interference or punishment.”58
In the 2009 UNHRC Report, The U.N. Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression (Special Rapporteur) stated, “[m]echanisms for 
criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed important so that 
leaders were held to account [and that] [f]reedom of expression was not 
limited to statements considered appropriate or beneficial.”59
Non-democratic countries around the world commonly abuse criminal 
defamation laws to stifle freedom of expression, and silence the opposition 
in circumstances of public debate. In this context, the Human Rights 
Committee held that “the mere fact that forms of expression are considered 
to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to justify the imposition of 
penalties.”60 Laws such as lèse majesté, desacato,61 or offenses such as 
disrespect for authority,62 disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation of 
                                                     
54. See Human Rights Committee, Adimayo, M. Aduayom, Sofianou T. Diasso and Yawo S. 
Dobou v. Togo, Communications Nos. 422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, ¶ 7.4, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/51/D/422/1990, 423/1990 & 424/1990, (July 12, 1996) [hereinafter HRC 57th Sess.].
55. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
56. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, ¶ 25, 93rd Sess., 
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GBR/CO/6, (July 30, 2008) [hereinafter HRC 93rd Sess.].
57. See General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47; Human Rights Committee, Pavel 
Kozlov v. Belarus, Communication No. 1986/2010, ¶ 7.5, 111th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/111/D/1986/2010, (July 7–25, 2014).
58. HRC 57th Sess., supra note 54, ¶ 7.4.
59. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights and Follow-Up to the World Conference on Human Rights, ¶ 10, 10th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/10/31/Add.3, (Jan. 16, 2009) [hereinafter HRC 10th Sess.].
60. HRC 83rd Sess., supra note 52, ¶ 6.8.
61. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Dominican Republic, ¶ 22, 71st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/71/DOM, (Apr. 
26, 2001).
62. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Honduras, ¶ 17, 88th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/HND/CO/1, (Dec. 13, 
2006).
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the head of state63 and the protection of the honor of public officials,64 and
any defamation laws should be carefully drafted and implemented to ensure 
that they comply with the ICCPR. Furthermore, the Human Rights 
Committee recommends that all such laws include the defense of truth and 
“with regard to comments about public figures, consideration should be 
given to avoiding penalizing or otherwise rendering unlawful untrue 
statements that have been published in error but without malice.”65
In any case of defamation, imprisonment should never be an 
appropriate penalty. The Special Rapporteur stated that “[s]anctions for 
defamation should not be so large as to exert a chilling effect on freedom of 
opinion and expression and the right to seek, receive and impart 
information; penal sanctions, in particular imprisonment, should never be 
applied.”66
Consequently, domestic defamation laws must be constructed 
carefully to meet the international standards articulated by the six-prong test, 
and so as to not infringe on free speech aimed at both holding public 
officials accountable and promoting good governance. Criminal sanctions 
for such speech will almost certainly render a state as non-compliant with 
their international obligations.
B. Incitement Under the International Standard of Freedom of 
Expression
1. General Prohibitions Against Incitement and Hate Speech
Preventing incitement of violence and hate speech are important 
tenants of international law as articulated by Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the 
ICCPR. Article 20, Paragraph 2 states that “any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law” (the Incitement 
Prohibition).67 The Incitement Prohibition is “fully compatible with the 
right of freedom of expression as contained in [A]rticle 19 [of the ICCPR], 
                                                     
63. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Zambia, ¶ 25, 90th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ZMB/CO/3, (Aug. 9, 2007).
64. Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 40 of the Covenant:  Costa Rica, ¶ 11, 91st Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CRI/CO/5, (Nov. 16, 
2007).
65. HRC 93rd Sess., supra note 56, ¶ 25.
66. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Mr. Abid Hussain, ¶ 28(h), 55th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1999/64 (Jan. 29, 1999).
67. Human Rights Instruments, General Comment No. 11:  Article 20, ¶ 2, 19th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I) (May 27, 2008) [hereinafter HRI 19th Sess.].
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the exercise of which carries with it special duties and responsibilities.”68
For it to become effective, “there ought to be a law making it clear that . . . 
advocacy as described [is] contrary to public policy and providing for an 
appropriate sanction in case of violation.”69
According to the Human Rights Committee, “restrictions on 
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be 
permissible under Article 19, paragraph 3, which lays down requirements 
for determining whether restrictions on expression are permissible.” 70
Under this provision, “[a]ny restriction on the right to freedom of 
expression must cumulatively meet the following conditions: it must be 
provided by law, it must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3 (a) 
and (b) of Article 19, and it must be necessary to achieve a legitimate 
purpose.”71
                                                     
68. Id.; Human Rights Committee, Malcolm Ross v. Canada, Commc’n No. 736/1997, ¶ 11.6, 
70th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/70/D/736/1997, (Oct. 20, 2000) [hereinafter HRC 70th Sess.].  The HRC 
recognized the overlapping nature of Articles 19 and 20, stating that it considered that restrictions on 
expression which may fall within the scope of Article 20 must also be permissible under Article 19, 
paragraph 3, which lays down requirements for determining whether restrictions on expression are 
permissible. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.6.
69. HRI 19th Sess., supra note 67, ¶ 2.
70. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 10.6.
71. Human Rights Committee, Robert Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993, ¶ 
9.4, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/58/D/550/1993, (Nov. 8, 1996); General Comment No. 34, supra
note 34, ¶ 12 (elaborating on the links between Articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR:
50. Articles 19 and 20 are compatible with and complement each other. The acts 
that are addressed in article 20 are all subject to restriction pursuant to article 19, 
paragraph 3. As such, a limitation that is justified on the basis of article 20 must 
also comply with article 19, paragraph 3. 
51. What distinguishes the acts addressed in article 20 from other acts that may be 
subject to restriction under article 19, paragraph 3, is that for the acts addressed in 
article 20, the Covenant indicates the specific response required from the State:
their prohibition by law. It is only to this extent that article 20 may be considered 
as lex specialis with regard to article 19. 
52. It is only with regard to the specific forms of expression indicated in article 20 
that States parties are obliged to have legal prohibitions. In every case in which 
the State restricts freedom of expression it is necessary to justify the prohibitions 
and their provisions in strict conformity with article 19.
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2. Three-Prong Test to Determine the Validity of Measures
Implementing the Incitement Prohibition
Any restriction of freedom of expression implementing Article 20 of 
the incitement prohibition requires compliance with the three-prong test set 
forth in Article 19, paragraph 3.
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 34 breaks down 
the elements of the three-prong test that must be met in order to impose 
exceptional restrictions on freedom of expression. 72 The first prong 
requires that laws are formally provided for in a way that they are 
understandable to the public, allowing the public to conform their behavior 
accordingly, and which are also capable of being applied in a consistent 
way by those charged with their execution.73 The second prong requires 
that laws be necessary for a legitimate purpose.74 If an alternate restriction 
is capable of achieving the legitimate aim, then the law is an inappropriate 
use of the restrictions permitted under Article 19. 75 The third prong 
requires proportionality, and that the restrictive measure is the least 
intrusive means of achieving the protective function.76 Both formalized 
laws, in addition to the judicial authorities charged with their administration, 
must reflect this least restrictive principle. 77 Furthermore, the 
proportionality of restrictions must take into account the form of expression 
being restricted, and when issues of public importance are the subject of 
these expressions, the ICCPR calls for uninhibited expression.78 Finally, in 
instances where there is a necessary and proportionate restriction aimed at 
legitimate concerns posed by the exercise of freedom of expression, the 
state must, in each case where it imposes criminal sanctions or penalties 
against specific individuals, demonstrate a causal nexus between that 
individual’s expression, the immediate threat posed by that expression, and 
the particular and urgent cause of sanctions against that specific 
individual.79
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR) has detailed the three-prong test for the incitement 
                                                     
72. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ E.5.
73. Id.
74. HRC 47th Sess., supra note 49.




79. Human Rights Committee, Hak—Chul Shin v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 
926/2000, ¶ 7.3, 80th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000, (March 15–April 2, 2004) [hereinafter 
HRC 80th Sess.].
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prohibition more succinctly. According to the OHCHR, “Article 20 of the 
ICCPR requires there be a high threshold” when restricting free speech with 
incitement laws, so as to conform to Article 19 requirements of legality, 
proportionality, and necessity.80 The restrictions should be clear and not 
limit free speech in an overly broad or untargeted way. When sanctions 
limiting speech are applied, the benefit to the protected interest must
outweigh the harm to freedom of expression caused by the sanctions.81
In addition, there have been several cases in which the Human Rights 
Committee has looked at the intent behind the incitement to discrimination,
hostility, or violence. In 1997, the Human Rights Committee distinguished 
between “critical discussion” and “advocating contempt against a group” in 
order to determine if the speech restriction was permissible.82 A 2001 Joint 
Statement on Racism and Media by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and 
the Organization of American States (OAS) Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression states that “no one should be penalized for the
dissemination of ‘hate speech’ unless it has been shown that they did so 
with the intention of inciting discrimination, hostility or violence.”83
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CONDUCT OF THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA IN 
RELATION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
Waleed Abu al-Khair is a Saudi Arabian human rights lawyer and 
activist. He is an outspoken advocate for political reform, particularly for 
establishing a democratic state in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He
focuses on advancing individual liberties and defending victims of human 
rights violations. In 2009, he founded the Monitor of Human Rights in 
Saudi Arabia (MHRSA), an independent human rights organization.84 On 
October 29, 2013, in retaliation for his work as a human rights lawyer and 
activist, Abu al-Khair was sentenced by the criminal court in Jeddah to 
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” by publically 
criticizing a court decision against his client. On February 6, 2014, the 
Court of Appeal in Mecca upheld the sentence.
                                                     
80. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
81. Human Rights Council, Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, ¶ 18, 22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/22/17/Add.4, (Jan. 11, 2013).
82. HRC 70th Sess., supra note 68, ¶ 11.5.
83. Racism and the Media, ORG. FOR SECURITY & CO-OPERATION EUR. (Feb. 27, 2001),
http://www.osce.org/fom/40120?download=true.
84. E-mail from Ekua Quansah, Human Rights Award Selection Committee, to LSUC Human 
Rights Award Selection Committee (June 15, 2016), http://www.lrwc.org/ws/wp-content/uploads/2016
/11/Waleed-Abu-al-Khair.Nomination.Ltr_.-LRWC.UIA_.LSEW_.15-.June_.2016.pdf.
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A few weeks earlier on October 6, 2013, a second case was filed 
against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized Criminal Court on various 
charges, including “harming the reputation of the Kingdom,” “inciting the 
public opinion against the Kingdom,” “breaking allegiance to the ruler,” 
and “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” for similar reasons. In July 
2014, he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison with a five-year suspended 
sentence. On January 12, 2015, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction 
of the Specialized Criminal Court and extended the sentence from ten to 
fifteen years after Abu al-Khair refused the judge’s offer to apologize for 
his acts.
This Part analyzes the second case against Waleed Abu al-Khair under 
international human rights law.
A. Violation of the Right to Freedom of Expression and Opinion
According to international human rights law, everyone shall have the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to hold opinions without 
interference through any media or form of expression.85 This right includes 
criticism towards the government, its officials and public affairs.86 The 
obligation to respect the right to freedom of expression and opinion is 
binding on all branches of the state (executive, legislative, and judicial) and 
extends to “expression of views and opinions that offend, shock or 
disturb.” 87 International human rights law also recognizes that 
“mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political leaders, were deemed 
important so that leaders were held to account and that freedom of 
expression was not limited to statements considered appropriate or 
beneficial.”88
Saudi Arabia is a nondemocratic country where the fundamental rights of 
citizens are denied.89 The Kingdom is ruled by a fully authoritarian regime 
where freedom of expression is neither guaranteed nor respected.90 Under this 
regime, any kind of public dissent is prohibited and dissenters are severely 
                                                     
85. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, ¶ 20(a), 77th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/17/27, ¶ 20, (May 16, 2011).
86. Id.
87. Id. ¶ 37.
88. HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.
89. Mayan Derhy, Top Five Non-Democratic Countries, BORGEN PROJECT (Jan. 10, 2017), 
https://borgenproject.org/top-five-non-democratic-countries/.
90. Erwin van Veen, Return of Authoritarianism Primes Middle East for More Conflict,
CLINGENDAEL (Dec. 19, 2017, 13:33), https://www.clingendael.org/publication/return-authoritarianism-
primes-middle-east-more-conflict.
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punished, especially those who openly express their disagreement with the 
government or discuss reforming the Kingdom’s political system.
The prosecution and sentencing of Waleed Abu al-Khair for 
expressing his criticism of the judiciary were carried out within the context 
of full authoritarianism. In 2011, the public prosecutor charged Abu al-
Khair with “contempt of the judiciary” and “harming the reputation of the 
Kingdom” pursuant to general principles of Shari’a law. The charges were 
based on the fact that Abu al-Khair publically criticized a court decision 
sentencing Samar Badawi, his client at the time, to six months in prison in a 
male guardianship case against her abusive father. In addition, Abu al-
Khair was accused of sharing information about Badawi’s case with 
international organizations and for signing a petition,91 which criticized the 
severity of the sentence against peaceful political activists and condemned 
the use of violence by security forces against protesters. Based on the 
indictment of the public prosecutor, the criminal court in Jeddah, and 
subsequently the court of appeal in Mekkah, sentenced Abu al-Khair to 
three months in prison for “contempt of the judiciary” for signing a petition, 
which the court qualified as damaging to the judiciary and to Islam.92
In the second case filed against Abu al-Khair before the Specialized 
Criminal Court, the charging document filed by the public prosecutor 
included charges of “criticizing and insulting the judiciary” and 
“communicating with international organizations in order to undermine the 
reputation of the Kingdom.” These charges were based on the same facts 
mentioned in the indictment document filed a year earlier, namely: 
“criticizing the Kingdom by communicating on the internet and satellite 
channels materials related to the sentences against [political] reformers,” 
“signing a petition,” and “publishing comments on twitter criticizing the 
government and the human rights status in the Kingdom.”93 In 2014, the 
Specialized Criminal Court in Jeddah, and subsequently the appellate court,
sentenced Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison based on the charging 
document of the public prosecutor, which included the public defamation 
offenses of “criticizing and insulting the judicial authority” and “harming 
the reputation of the Kingdom.”
                                                     
91. See EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 33.
92. Id. The Petition included statements such as:  “unjustified security escalation,” “unfair 
judgments,” and “painful repressive measures.”  The Petition condemns “the use of weapons” and 
demands the constitution of a “judicial fact-finding committee, the identification of persons and entities 
involved in the killings, and bringing them to justice.”  It is worth noting that Abu al-Khair was not 
involved in the drafting of the Petition but was one of the sixty-two petitioners who signed it.
93. Id. Twitter comments include the following: “Human Rights in Saudi Arabia . . . going 
backwards!”; “Saudi Arabia through its oil, buys the silence of the western world due to what is 
happening in Bahrain.”; “The politicians remain careful to gain legitimacy from Wahhabism in a regime 
that has not much on the human level.”
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Charging and sentencing on the basis of the expression of one’s 
opinion, in any form whatsoever, even if such opinion is deemed critical or 
offensive toward any third party, including public officials, violates the 
principle consecrated in Article 19 of the ICCPR.94 The criminalization of 
Abu al-Khair’s expression by the Saudi Arabian court violated this standard.
Therefore, by violating Abu al-Khair’s right to express opinions and 
ideas freely, even if such opinion offended public officials, or were found 
shocking or disturbing by the judicial and executive authorities of the 
country, Saudi Arabia has violated international human rights law.
B. Violation of the General Prohibition Against the Criminalization of 
Speech Directed at Public Officials
1. Saudi Arabia’s Restrictions on Speech Directed at Public 
Officials
According to international human rights law, criminalizing the holding 
of an opinion is prohibited. 95 The “harassment, intimidation, arrest, 
detention, trial or imprisonment” of any individual based on the expression 
of an opinion, constitutes a violation of the ICCPR.96 As discussed above, 
international law recognizes a special prohibition against the 
criminalization of speech directed at public officials due to public figures 
being “required to tolerate a greater degree of criticism than private 
citizens,” and because “mechanisms for criticism, particularly of political 
leaders, were deemed important so that leaders were held to account.”97
The Saudi laws expressly criminalize any critical speech directed at 
the government or its officials and Saudi judges broadly interpret these laws 
to stifle any form of speech that criticizes the Kingdom and its public 
affairs.98 The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing defines a terrorist 
crime as any act carried out by the perpetrator to commit a criminal 
activity . . . towards the purpose of disabling the Basic Law or any of its 
articles; harming the reputation or status of the country. 99 The Saudi 
government relies on this law to crush peaceful opposition and justify 
severe sentences against those who express critical opinions.
                                                     
94. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
95. Id.
96. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 34; see also HRC Zaire, supra note 41.
97. HRC 10th Sess., supra note 59, ¶ 10.
98. Saudi Arabia:  New Terrorism Regulations Assault Rights, HUM. RTS.WATCH (Mar. 20, 
2014, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/20/saudi-arabia-new-terrorism-regulationsassault
-rights.
99. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
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Similarly, the Anti-Cyber Crime Law of 2009 lists “defamation” as 
one of the cyber-crimes subject to imprisonment, but fails to define this 
offense.100 With such a broad term, any critical expression can amount to a 
punishable crime under this law. Article 6 of the same law provides that 
the “[p]roduction, preparation, transmission, or storage of materials 
impinging on public order, religious values, public morals, and privacy” is a 
cyber-crime, which similarly encompasses any communication of material 
deemed critical towards public affairs or religion.101
The opinions expressed by Abu al-Khair, whether in the petition, on 
television, or via Twitter, were directed at the judicial authority and are 
protected by international law. Despite that, and according to the facts of this 
case, the Saudi Arabian legal system criminalized this expression by pressing 
charges against Abu al-Khair for the alleged crime of insulting the judiciary, 
and the criminal court sentenced him to three months in prison on that charge. 
Two years later, the Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair to 
fifteen years in prison for charges related to “harming the reputation of the 
Kingdom” and “inciting the public opinion against the Kingdom,” based on the 
provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and Anti-Cyber 
Crime Law. Under a broad definition of “terrorist crime” and “defamation,” 
these laws harshly criminalize holding any opinion suspected of harming the 
reputation of the Kingdom or any of its officials.
The sentencing of Abu al-Khair based on defamation charges violates 
the universal standard on defamation set out in international law. The 
analysis of the case, in light of the six-prong test discussed in the above 
section, demonstrates that Saudi Arabia fails to comply with international 
law requirements.
2. Analysis of the Multi-Prong Test Related to Defamation
The first prong of this test requires that the laws on defamation must be 
provided by law and must not be overbroad; must address one of the legitimate 
aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of Article 19 (respect of the rights and 
reputation of others; protection of national security or of public order, or of 
public health or morals); must be necessary to achieve a legitimate purpose;
must be the least intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective 
function; and must be proportionate to the interest being protected.102
                                                     
100. Anti-Cyber Crime Law, M/17, art. 3(5) (Sa.) (March 26, 2007) [hereinafter M/17].  Article 
3, Section 5 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law states, “Any person who commits one of the following cyber 
crimes shall be subject to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one year and a fine not exceeding 
hundred thousand riyals or to either punishment: Defamation and infliction of damages upon others 
through the use of various information technology devices.”  Id.
101. Id.
102. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 26–30.
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Saudi Arabian laws expressly criminalize defamatory statements that 
harm the reputation of public officials or the Kingdom. The Law of 
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing harshly punishes any speech that “harm 
the reputation or status of the country,”103 and the Anti-Cyber Crime Law 
criminalizes defamation including any expression deemed critical to public 
affairs and religion.104 The Law of Printed Materials and Publications 
proscribes expression of opinion that is “insulting to Islam and to the 
system of government”105 and bans and criminalizes any speech that is 
“damaging to the reputation of the Grand Mufti, members of the Council of 
Senior Religious Scholars, or senior government officials.”106 While the 
laws on defamation are codified, these laws include overbroad expressions 
such as “reputation or status of the country,” “public affairs and religion,” 
“Islam [or] the system of government,” which render these laws not precise 
enough to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.107
In addition, the predominance of the Shari’a law in the Kingdom adds to the 
broadness of such laws, especially that Saudi judges have broad discretion 
in the interpretation of the law.
Moreover, the ground for restrictions provided in the Saudi Arabian 
laws and on which the court decisions in Abu al-Khair’s case are based, is 
the protection of the reputation of the country and its judicial system.
Legitimate interests for restriction of free speech include: the rights of 
others, 108 such as the human rights articulated by the ICCPR; national 
security,109 such as the violent overthrow of the constitutional order; and 
public order,110 such as speaking in a public place that may be disruptive to 
the public order. This interest of Saudi Arabian law is not protected by the 
universal standard of the ICCPR and restricting Abu al-Khair’s speech on 
this basis is therefore not necessary for a legitimate purpose. Therefore, 
                                                     
103. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
104. M/17, supra note 100, art. 6.
105. Law of Printed Materials and Publications, M/32, art. 18 (Sa.) (Nov. 2000) [hereinafter 
M/32].
106. EL-HAGE & BOUSTANI, supra note 39, at 10.
107. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 25, 34.  Paragraph 34 requires restricting
laws not to be overbroad and Paragraph 25 states that laws “must be formulated with sufficient precision 
to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.” Id.
108. See Human Rights Committee, Jong-Cheol v. Republic of Korea, Commc’n No. 968/2001, 
¶ 8.3, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/84/D/968/2001, (July. 25, 2005).
109. See Human Rights Committee, AK & AR v. Uzbekistan, Commc’n No. 1233/2003, 95th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1233/2003, (Mar. 31, 2009).
110. See Human Rights Committee, Patrick Coleman v. Australia, Commc’n No. 1157/2003, ¶ 
7.3, 87th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/87/D/1157/2003, (July 10–28, 2006).
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sentencing Abu al-Khair to fifteen years in prison on the basis of 
defamation charges is neither proportional nor justified.
Because the legality, legitimate grounds, necessity and proportionality 
elements are not satisfied, Saudi Arabia fails this prong of the test.
The second prong of the test requires that the defamatory statement in 
question be a fact instead of an opinion.111 The third prong imposes a 
heightened standard for public officials and figures, because they are 
naturally subject to criticisms and opposition.112 The Saudi Arabian laws 
on defamation and the judges in the case of Abu al-Khair do not distinguish 
between statements of fact and opinion. Additionally, they do not suggest 
that public officials and public figures are subject to a heightened level of 
criticism. In fact, harming the reputation of the country, including its 
officials, carries a sentence of up to twenty years in prison.113 The second 
and third prongs of the test are therefore not satisfied.
The fourth prong of the test requires the existence of actual malice in 
the defendant’s actions in cases concerning defamation of public 
officials.114 The Saudi Arabian laws do not mandate the existence of actual 
malice as a prerequisite for persecution.115 The court in Abu al-Khair’s 
case does not state actual malice as a requirement for criminal defamation 
and charged him solely based on the fact that he expressed a critical opinion. 
This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fifth prong indicates that the burden of proof lies with the 
plaintiff.116 In other words, when an individual is criminally prosecuted for 
violating statutes legitimately and necessarily restricting free speech, the 
prosecution must plead with particularity how the individual on trial 
violated the law, and has the burden of proving these facts before a court of 
law. The Saudi statutes do not set forth the burden of proof and Abu al-
Khair’s case lacked the due process required for demonstrating proof in an 
impartial judicial proceeding. Saudi Arabia’s prosecution and sentencing of 
Abu al-Khair violated his right to a fair trial and the right to due process.
After he was arrested during a hearing on April 15, 2014, he was denied 
access to his lawyer. On April 22, 2014, the judge refused to provide Abu 
al-Khair’s lawyer with any explanation for his arrest and detention, and he 
was thus unable to present his defense.  Consequently, the plaintiff-
prosecutors did not present any proof for the charges against Abu al-Khair 
                                                     
111. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
112. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 38.
113. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
114. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 47.
115. The fourth prong of international standards relating to defamation under the ICCPR 
requires the existence of actual malice on the part of the defendant in cases concerning public officials.
116. See ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 14(2).
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who was charged based on the evidence gathered by the Bureau of 
Investigation and Public Prosecution during an interrogation. The plaintiff-
prosecutors in this case could not have met their burden of proving their 
case if Mr. Abu al-Khair was denied a defense, as there was no impartial 
judicial proceeding within which to prove their case. This prong is 
therefore not satisfied.
The sixth prong sets forth the defenses available to the defendant: truth 
and public interest of the subject matter.117 Saudi laws do not state that truth 
and public interest are justifications for the defamatory statement.118 Likewise, 
in Abu al-Khair’s case, he was unable to present his defense as he was denied 
access to his lawyer. This prong is therefore not satisfied.
The fact that the Saudi Arabian laws and its application by the courts 
do not comply with the multi-prong test renders Saudi Arabia as a non-
compliant state with the universal standard on defamation. By enacting and 
implementing laws that unambiguously proscribe the expression of one’s 
opinion, and even more harshly when directed at public figures, Saudi 
Arabia, acting through its executive branch, is internationally responsible 
for violating the prohibition against criminalization of speech and the 
special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression 
directed at public officials.119 Additionally, by detaining and imprisoning 
Abu al-Khair based on such laws, Saudi Arabia, acting through its judicial 
branch, has violated the prohibition against criminalization of speech and 
the special prohibition against the criminalization of forms of expression 
directed at public officials.120
C. Violation of the Incitement Prohibition
1. The Incitement Prohibition
The incitement prohibition limits the right to freedom of expression 
when hatred, hostility or violence are encouraged through the speech.121
According to international human rights law, a particular government’s 
measures in implementing the incitement prohibition requires a high 
threshold because, as a matter of fundamental principle, limitations on 
speech must always remain an exception.122 Such a threshold must be read 
                                                     
117. Id. art. 14(3)(d).
118. HRC 17th Sess., supra note 37.
119. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19.
120. Id.
121. Id. art. 20(2).
122. Id. arts. 19–20.
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in consonance with the three-prong test for restrictions123—namely, such 
restrictions must be provided by law (legality test); be narrowly defined to 
serve a legitimate interest (proportionality test); and be necessary to protect 
that interest (necessity test). In particular, the legal provision must not be 
overly broad or restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way.124 Similarly, 
the principle of proportionality must be respected not only in the law that 
frames the restrictions, but also by the administrative and judicial 
authorities in applying the law.125 As a result, when a state party invokes a 
legitimate ground for restriction of freedom of expression, it must 
demonstrate in a specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of 
the threat, and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action 
taken—in particular by establishing a direct and immediate connection 
between the expression and the threat.126
2. Analysis of the Three-Prong Test Related to the Incitement 
Prohibition
The legality test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting 
freedom of expression must be provided by law in a clear and targeted way, 
and must address one of the aims set out in paragraph 3(a) and (b) of 
Article 19 in respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of 
national security or public order, or public health or morals.127
Saudi laws and Shari’a law that govern most areas in the Kingdom are 
unclear, overly broad, and restrict speech in a wide or untargeted way, 
especially when the speech is found to be offensive, shocking, disturbing, 
or merely critical of the government or of Islam. In fact, the Law of 
Terrorism Crimes and its Financing,128 the Anti-Cyber Crime Law,129 the 
Law of Printed Materials and Publications,130 and the Law on Electronic 
Publications,131 all include provisions that restrict the right to freedom of 
expression, and are not formulated with sufficient precision to enable an 
individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly. Instead, the legal 
system confers arbitrary discretion on prosecutors and judges to restrict 
                                                     
123. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).
124. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 34.
125. Id.
126. HRC 80th Sess., supra note 79.
127. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 25.
128. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra note 4.
129. M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).
130. M/32, supra note 105, art. 18 (Sa.).
131. Saudi Arabia: Rescind New Online Restrictions, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Jan. 7, 2011, 6:04 
P.M.), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/01/07/saudi-arabia-rescind-new-online-restrictions.
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freedom of expression and apply the incitement prohibition arbitrarily.
Even if the laws were properly narrowly constructed, the unlimited 
interpretation power possessed by the Saudi judiciary corrupts the equal 
application of the law necessary to safeguard the limitations of the 
incitement prohibition enshrined in international human rights law.
In addition, the restrictions to freedom of expression as provided in the 
Saudi Arabian laws are not based on legitimate grounds set out in the 
ICCPR. The Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing and the Anti-
Cyber Crime Law state that the grounds for restriction are to protect “public 
order,” “the stability of the state,” “national unity,” “the reputation or status 
of the country,” and impinging on public order and “religious values.”132
Most of these grounds are not legitimate grounds according to the universal 
standard, which recognize as such the “the rights or reputations of others” 
and “the protection of national security or of public order or of public 
health or morals.”133 Therefore, Saudi Arabia fails the legality test for the 
implementation of the incitement prohibition as established under 
international human rights law because the law on incitement is neither 
adequately clear nor targeted.
The proportionality test requires that the incitement prohibition 
restricting freedom of expression must not be overbroad, must be the least 
intrusive instrument necessary to achieve the protective function, and must 
be proportionate to the interest being protected.134
In both legal cases against Abu al-Khair, the courts failed to demonstrate 
that the legal provisions of the Law of Terrorism Crimes and its Financing, the 
Anti-Cyber Crime Law, and the Shari’a law used by the courts were clearly 
and narrowly defined to protect a legitimate government interest and that they 
were aimed at the “respect of the rights and reputation of others, protection of
national security or of public order, or of public health or morals.”135 As 
evidenced by the charges in both indictment documents and court decisions, 
the government’s alleged interest in this case is the protection of the reputation 
                                                     
132. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶¶ 21, 29, 30. Paragraph 29 provides that although 
the exercise of the right to freedom of expression carries with it special duties and responsibilities leading to 
restriction of freedom of expression in order to protect the rights or reputations of others or the protection of 
national security or of public order, such restricting laws should not jeopardize the freedom of expression as 
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such laws relating to national security or public order crafted and applied in a manner that conforms to the 
strict requirements of Paragraph 3 of Article 19 of ICCPR.  Id. It is not compatible with Paragraph 3 to 
invoke such laws to suppress the public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national 
security or to prosecute journalists and other human rights defenders. Id. PRETENSE OF PROGRESS, supra
note 4; M/17, supra note 100, art. 6 (Sa.).
133. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34.
134. Id. ¶ 34.
135. ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19(3).
2018] El-Hage & Assaf Boustani 393
of the Kingdom both inside and outside the country. Abu al-Khair is charged 
and sentenced with “subverting public order in the Kingdom,” “discrediting the 
Kingdom,” and “inciting public opinion against the Kingdom,” and 
“transmitting information prejudicial to public order”. These charges are based 
on the fact that Abu al-Khair expressed criticism toward the Kingdom, signed a 
petition calling for democratic reforms, and communicated with international 
organizations and provided information about the status of human rights in 
Saudi Arabia.
The charge of “subverting public order,” and “inciting public opinion 
against the Kingdom” is not justified given that Abu al-Khair’s peaceful 
activities legitimately exercised his right to freedom of expression under the 
ICCPR. In addition, prohibiting criticism towards the Kingdom and its 
officials in order to preserve its reputation is not a legitimate interest under 
international legal standards and especially in the circumstances of public 
debate since expressing critical views is a right guaranteed by the ICCPR.
In addition, the ICCPR places a higher value on expression critical to public 
figures, even when the expression is offensive, shocking or disturbing.136
The punishment of imprisonment for fifteen years with a fifteen-year 
travel ban after release is clearly disproportional to any interest being 
protected. In fact, as the interests being protected are not legitimate, any 
penalty imposed could never be proportionate. Therefore, Saudi Arabia 
fails the proportionality test required for the implementation of the 
incitement prohibition.
The necessity test requires that the incitement prohibition restricting 
freedom of expression must be necessary to protect a legitimate interest, 
and must be the only way to achieve protection.137
The Specialized Criminal Court sentenced Abu al-Khair for “subverting 
public order in the Kingdom” and “transmitting information prejudicial to 
public order,” because he publically criticized the judiciary by signing a 
petition and shared information about the human rights’ situation of the country 
with international organizations. The Court interpreted these simple acts of 
expression, protected by international human rights law, as threatening to the 
public order. Although the protection of public order is considered a legitimate 
government interest by international human rights law, in this case the actual 
interest at issue is the protection of the reputation of the Kingdom. Legitimate 
grounds must conform to the strict requirements of Article 19, Paragraph 3.138
As the Human Rights Committee has noted: “a) It is not compatible with 
paragraph 3, for instance, to invoke such laws to suppress or withhold from the 
                                                     
136. See Human Rights Committee, Bodrožiü v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication 
No.1180/2003, ¶ 7.2, 85th Sess., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/85/D/1180/2003, (Oct. 17–Nov. 3, 2005).
137. General Comment No. 34, supra note 34, ¶ 33.
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public information of legitimate public interest that does not harm national 
security or to prosecute journalists, researchers, environmental activists, human 
rights defenders, or others, for having disseminated such information.”139
Legitimate grounds related to national security involve restricting 
expressions that promote the violent overthrow of the government 140 or 
expressions related to official secrets and sedition, 141 a far cry from the 
expressions made by Abu al-Khair which were simply critical to the government. 
Examples of legitimate grounds connected to public order involve contempt of 
court142 and parliamentary privilege.143 However, even here the scope of the 
legitimacy for these grounds is strictly limited, and manifestly distinct from the 
statements made by Abu al-Khair.144 His statements criticizing the Kingdom’s 
judiciary for sentencing peaceful activists fall well outside the scope of 
expressions legitimately restricted under international law.
In any case, the court failed to demonstrate that sentencing Abu al-
Khair to fifteen years in prison was justified and necessary to protect any 
legitimate interest, especially when the forms of expression used by Abu al-
Khair (i.e. signing a petition, publishing comments on Twitter, 
communicating with international organizations) did not involve any kind 
of violence or incitement of violence whatsoever. Even where a legitimate 
interest exists, such as with contempt of court, the punishment must fit the 
crime.145 International jurisprudence demonstrates that the lengthy prison 
sentence handed to Abu al-Khair was unnecessary and disproportionate to 
his actions.146 Necessity and proportionality are both strict requirements a 
state must adhere to in order to abide by their Article 19 responsibilities.147
                                                     
139. Id.
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In addition, the universal standard as established by the ICCPR requires 
the existence of an intent, specifically an intent to incite discrimination, 
hostility, or violence.148 It requires causation between the expression and 
threat.149 However, the court failed to demonstrate that Abu al-Khair had the 
intent to “incite violence” as it is suggested by the charges against him. He was 
charged for signing a petition that is critical of the government and for 
defending victims of human rights violations. His acts did not involve any kind 
of violence. Abu al-Khair was charged in relation to his opinions and 
expressions about social and political issues in the country. There was no 
threat associated with his expression and the court failed to demonstrate any 
causation between his speech and any threat to the public order.
In conclusion, the speech restrictive measures adopted by the 
Kingdom and implemented by its judicial authorities fail to meet the three-
prong test under the ICCPR, which renders the Saudi Arabian state as non-
compliant with the universal standard on incitement. As a result, through 
these measures, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia violated the right of Abu al-
Khair to freely hold and express his opinion and to disseminate information 
to others whether inside or outside of the Kingdom.
As a result, Saudi Arabia is responsible for the violation of Article 19 of 
the UDHR, Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 32 of the Arab Charter for 
Human Rights, depriving Abu al-Khair from fundamental rights recognized by 
all international legal instruments.150 Saudi Arabia’s domestic law does not 
meet the minimum thresholds of legality, proportionality, and necessity under 
international law with regards to freedom of expression.
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V. CONCLUSION
Saudi Arabia is ruled by an absolute monarchy, with no independent 
judiciary, separation of powers, independent media, or political parties. 151
Citizens have no freedom of thought, expression, religion or association.
Under this regime, there is no guarantee of independence in the administration 
of justice or respect for the fundamental rights of citizens, especially for those 
who openly express their disagreement with the government.
The prosecution and trials in the case of Waleed Abu al-Khair were 
carried out in the context of arbitrariness, abuse of power and full 
authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia. This article concludes that Saudi Arabia 
has violated Abu al-Khair’s right to freedom of expression. He was 
convicted under defamation and incitement laws simply for expressing his 
opinions, calling for democratic reform, and advocating for human rights in 
the Kingdom. Specifically, he was charged and later convicted under the 
internationally wrongful grounds of harming the Kingdom’s reputation and 
inciting public opinion against the Kingdom.
Moreover, Waleed Abu al-Khair was not provided a fair trial or the 
opportunity to present a defense, as is required by international law. He 
was given a fifteen-year prison sentence, an unnecessary and 
disproportionate response to comments made without malice and without 
the intent to incite violence. His expressions were simply aimed at 
promoting the human rights articulated by the ICCPR and other 
international instruments.
Abu al-Khair has been imprisoned since April 2014 and his case is one 
among many. Despite its seat at the UNHRC and its recent appointment to 
lead an influential U.N. Human Rights panel,152 the Kingdom still regularly 
engages in the systematic repression of activists and human rights defenders, 
often leading to numerous years of imprisonment, without trial, and the use 
of repressive measures against them.153
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